Leveraging Academia to Improve NGO Driven Intelligence by MacLeod, David T.
Journal of Conflict Studies 
 
 
107 
Leveraging Academia to Improve NGO Driven Intelligence  
 
by 
David T. MacLeod 
ABSTRACT 
Criminals and irregular fighters target non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for a variety of 
political and economic reasons forcing some NGOs to increase their safety through NGO-driven 
intelligence.  The analytic capability of NGO intelligence must be strengthened if NGOs are to 
survive in an increasingly dangerous operational environment. Academia, through remote access 
analysis, provides a non-intrusive approach to support NGO-driven intelligence. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Currently, militaries effectively leverage academic institutions and resources to build theory and examine 
military-related topics; an appropriate example would be the work of the Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society 
at the University of New Brunswick. However, academia can provide more than just theory.  Practical experience in 
quantitative and qualitative analysis can be used to examine failed states and human security and to improve the 
effectiveness of non-governmental organization (NGO)-driven intelligence.  The analytic capability of NGO intelligence 
and safety must be strengthened if NGOs are to survive in an increasingly dangerous operational environment; academia 
provides a non-intrusive approach to improve analysis using remote-access analysis. 
 In 2006, an estimated 800 international and indigenous NGOs1 were operating in Afghanistan; the true number is 
not known.2 Many of these NGOs currently operate independently and are unable or unwilling to access government 
intelligence or information resources that may improve their security. This article addresses independent NGO insecurity 
from an intelligence point of view and demonstrates the potential of improving NGO-driven intelligence by leveraging 
academia as a means to improve NGO analytic capability. The security of NGOs should be of interest to personnel 
operating in or studying Afghanistan because security and development are entwined.3 
 To begin, the article loosely maps out the threat to NGOs, including the political and financial power of aid, the 
understanding of aid by criminals and insurgents,4 and the political and cultural threat that NGOs pose to insurgents.  
Next, a case study of NGO security incidents in Afghanistan (2005-06) demonstrates the potential for NGO-driven 
intelligence. The source data is tacit, latent, open-source5 information gleaned from NGO-generated security incident6 
reports. Blending traditional intelligence with social science research methods creates an intelligence product that is 
uncomplicated and does not intrude on NGOs’ operations or security.  Due to the nature of their role, NGOs have a 
plethora of information at their disposal but lack significant analytic capability and are reluctant to share detailed 
information for analysis with militaries or governments.7 The article concludes with a recommendation for closer 
relationships between NGOs and academia as a means to increase NGO analytic capacity and quality of intelligence 
products.  Despite NGOs’ significant capability to increase governmental capacity and legitimacy, research into NGO 
security is in its infancy.     
Academics have yet to provide one overarching definition of intelligence because of the variety of activities and 
actors it encompasses.8 In this article, NGO-driven intelligence is defined as the collection, collation, analysis, and 
dissemination of processed tacit, latent, and open-source information designed to provide NGOs with situational 
awareness and an understanding of the threat environment.  
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The focus of NGO-driven intelligence is the generation of material that facilitates survival of the NGO and its 
mandate.  The purpose of NGO-driven intelligence is to make intelligence available to NGO decision-makers, providing 
them with the opportunity to mitigate risk to national and international personnel, material, and equipment. The words, 
intelligence and even security are rarely used within NGO or UN literature because of their negative connotations.9 
“Safety” is the word most commonly used to describe NGO intelligence efforts.  Before discussing the improvement of 
NGO security, it is necessary to establish the risk to NGOs. 
The Risk to NGOs 
Research into NGO security is in its infancy and little academic research exists regarding NGO-driven 
intelligence or security products.10 The lack of data on NGO security has forced researchers and NGOs alike to rely on 
impressions and anecdotal evidence to drive their operational security policies.11 The widespread perceptions of mounting 
threats to NGO workers have driven many organizations to formalize, reform, and seriously reconsider their responsibility 
for both national and international workers.12  
What research that does exist indicates NGOs operating in hostile environments are at greater risk than ever.  
Between 2002 and 2006, there was a 400 percent increase in insurgent security incidents against NGOs.13  RAND 
reported that the lethality of the security incidents (incidents causing deaths) has increased 800 percent during the same 
reporting period.14 Violence directed at NGOs in Afghanistan has increased as the insurgency grows and has reduced 
NGO freedom of movement.15 
The nature of NGOs’ work no longer protects them.16 Past security methods, including acceptance practices, may 
no longer be as effective because the nature of warfare has evolved. David Kilcullen has argued that insurgency is a likely 
vehicle future opponents can use to bypass conventional military and political power. 17 Frank Hoffman has argued that, in 
this period of extremism, there will be a blurring of war, peace, combatants, and non-combatants in perpetual hybrid 
war.18 Other participant observers go so far as to assert that humanity is under assault.  Even if one disagrees with 
Hoffman or other analysts, obviously violent conflict has become unrestrained and is comprised of a complex mixture of 
networked criminality, corruption, religious fundamentalism, ethnic and communal violence, forced mass migration, 
illegal resource exploitation, and violent competition for life-sustaining resources, such as land and water.19  Non-state 
violent actors within the conflict will likely be adept at exploiting their environment; proficient in the use of increasingly 
portable firepower; use enabled electronic communications and be well informed; and effectively combine media, culture, 
and nationalism to shape the information environment to their benefit. Within unrestrained violent conflict, interconnected 
threats, such as crime used as a means to fund insurgent efforts, are common. Despite being at risk, NGOs will likely 
continue to play a prominent role in stability operations. 
The instability created by a constantly changing threat environment in Afghanistan contributes to NGO insecurity 
and undermines reconstruction efforts. Threats and security incidents impede the ability of NGOs to access beneficiaries, 
deliver humanitarian aid, and implement urgently needed reconstruction and development projects.20  For example, during 
the time period of 22 July-22 August 2009, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development’s National Solidarity 
Programme reported that increased security risks caused the suspension of activities in 1,340 communities in 15 provinces 
in Afghanistan.21  Effective NGO intelligence assessments may have reduced the number of failed programs by indicating 
the vulnerability of the security environment, meaning time and resources may have been preserved. 
NGOs are attacked because they are brokers of valuable commodities in a conflict zone. NGOs operate in an environment 
that is so complex that Mark Duffield has described it as neo-medieval.22 Within this confused and complex security 
environment, NGOs are attacked because they provide valuable goods and services, offer some stability, are perceived as 
providing aid to the government, and are usually culturally different from the population. Whether they realize it or not, 
NGOs are high-value targets because they are power brokers in the greater security, political, social, and economic 
landscape.  
In any insurgency, the people are the prize; therefore, in an insurgent war control over the material that keeps the 
populace alive means victory.23 NGO power originates from a seemingly limitless supply of humanitarian aid.24   Thus 
perceived as wealthy, international NGOs are prime targets for theft and extortion by opportunistic individuals or 
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organized crime.25 Consisting of locally valuable commodities, humanitarian aid provides a tempting target to any 
aggressor, whether criminal or insurgent. It also represents considerable political power.  Stolen humanitarian aid can 
sustain the aggressor; selling the aid becomes a source of income, trade, or means of obtaining weapons; and distributing 
the aid provides a means to coerce the population, enhancing the aggressor’s political power.  
To have legitimacy, the Afghan government must have resources for reconstruction, economic development, and 
infrastructure. The bulk of those resources are administered by foreign NGOs.  However, over the centuries, foreigners 
have repeatedly invaded Afghanistan. Such a history has built resentment toward foreign interference within Pashtu tribes 
within their state.26 In the eyes of some Afghans, NGOs are morally corrupt and part of a foreign intervention in Afghan 
affairs.27 The very legitimacy and stability NGOs are attempting to create may be threatened unless resources and 
development efforts have a palatable Afghan “face” and moral/cultural position. 
Insurgents, warlords, and criminals may perceive NGOs not just as government supporters but also as 
representatives of imperialism, neo-colonialism, or at least an alien political agenda. NGOs active with Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are associated with intelligence collection. Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al. have noted 
that “Many . . . felt that the Taliban and their spies were suspicious of people who were in regular contact with PRTs.” 28 
Since many NGOs are based in government administrative centers, NGOs are guilty of collaboration by association.29 
Moreover, NGOs serve as a basis for stability by providing the essentials of life while enhancing Afghanistan’s 
infrastructure. This spreads the government’s authority and legitimacy, eroding the chaos in which insurgents, warlords, 
and criminals thrive. 
Insurgents and criminals are not the only sources of danger in Afghanistan.  Some of the danger is created by 
NGOs themselves. Significant changes in the operating attitudes and procedures of NGOs may needlessly increase the 
danger. European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), the humanitarian funding and research arm of the European 
Union, provided a report outlining the pressures faced by NGOs.  The following is a summary of that report: 
• Despite dangers, NGOs are under pressure to remain within conflicts;  
• Donor pressure forces NGOs to operate where they would not have operated in the past;  
• The number of NGO operations have increased significantly; 
• Past mismanagement of security by an NGO  adversely affects the security of others; and 
• NGOs may advocate contentious issues that increase resistance to NGOs.30  
While both insurgents and government forces struggle for dominance, civilians are likely to be the victims of violence and 
coercion.  NGOs attempting to relieve the suffering of these civilians will themselves likely experience the same violence 
and coercion as the victims. Worse, the insurgents have targeted NGOs because these organizations provide the most 
significant means for the average Afghan to gain an understanding of the Western world.  The insurgents seek to maintain 
a gap in understanding to ease their manipulation of the population. 
NGOs face danger when producing intelligence. Activity in excess of a NGO’s mandate may result in unwanted 
or unwarranted attention. A database is considered a dangerous effort, but the replacement of anecdotal reporting by a 
systematic collection and analysis method is required if NGO security is to be improved.  Even simplistic mapping and 
analysis may be dangerous in certain environments.31 Maintenance of situational awareness and analysis of geographical 
patterns, ascertained through plotting events on a topographical map, have been used since the mid-nineteenth century.32 
Mapping current events, unexploded ordinances (UXOs), safe havens, and conducting route planning may easily be 
misinterpreted.  For instance, in 2007 there were increased reports of insurgents forcibly entering NGO compounds in 
search of links to NATO.33  Obviously, NGOs operate successfully using local knowledge that requires limited analysis 
and can be easily explained using local reference points; however, an international NGO conducting long-term planning 
requires clear, concise, processed information that reaches beyond the local environment.  Despite dangers, NGOs must 
produce intelligence to meet their mandates, and a safer method would see external actors provide and maintain a 
security-incident database, continuous analysis, and access-added information resources for NGOs.   
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In summary, because insurgency is a political war, those actors, such as NGOs, that provide stability and enhance 
government legitimacy are natural insurgent targets.  NGOs can provide legitimacy and strengthen the authority of 
governments like the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA) by providing the political goods and services that the 
government may not be able to provide.34 Essentially, insurgent attacks on NGOs undermine the political capital of the 
Canadian military, reconstruction, and political efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan.  
NGOs Have Sufficient Data to Create Intelligence 
The concept of NGO-driven intelligence is new35 and very few NGOs specialize in intelligence or situational 
analysis. Nevertheless, a community of NGOs operating in Afghanistan, realizing their shared vulnerability, formed the 
Afghanistan NGO Safety Organization (ANSO)36 in 2002. Today, the European Union, Swiss Aid, and the Norwegian 
government fund ANSO.  They have five offices (Kabul, Jalalabad, Herat, Kandahar, and Mazar-I-Sharief) with a staff of 
almost 50 people. However, ANSO does more training of NGOs than it does analysis.37 Their Kabul office acts as the 
information focal point. It collects security information from the regional security advisors in each of the five operational 
regions.38 ANSO is the only focal point for NGO security in Afghanistan.  
ANSO’s products are widely read and freely available on the internet.  While the accuracy of incident reporting 
and the collection of statistics are very good, the reports lack significant analysis or forecasting.  The inability to conduct 
deeper analysis is understandable.  Such analysis requires significant investment in personnel to collect and collate data, 
computing power to conduct multi-method qualitative and quantitative analysis, a well-managed incident database, and 
time.  The quality of ANSO’s products is important because the attempts to reduce risks to NGOs are being outstripped by 
the evolving insurgency.39 
NGO-driven intelligence will not be perfect. But NGOs are a vital part of civil society, affecting human security 
at a local level, with national and international effect.  As a result, NGOs need to generate the means to increase their own 
security. Threats to NGO operations have been growing; therefore, the importance of tailoring security products to a 
region, town, village, or road is essential.  NGOs require a greater understanding of an increasingly complex security 
environment as a means to ensure their own security. Intelligence provides both an immediate and long-term practical tool 
to enhance NGO security. 
Many NGO directors complain about the volume of incident reports they receive and mention that they wish there 
was more focus on making relevant incidents (those that happened in the same locations as their field offices) more 
useful. In the field, the volume of information available and the many methods of encountering information are likely to 
overwhelm managers.40  The number of data sources is only limited by imagination and accessibility to the public and the 
internet. Managers will likely come to rely on trained personnel to process information for them.41 In fact, ANSO exists 
because unprocessed information abounds; what is required is greater analysis.42 Clearly, more than enough data exist for 
NGOs to create their own intelligence.  To further illustrate the abundant data and the potential analytical power of 
academia, the author conducted a case study.  
Case Study of NGOs in Afghanistan (2005-2006) 
Classical intelligence analysis and social science research rarely meet, to the detriment of both intelligence and 
the social science community. The methods used within this study integrate the two by drawing on their individual 
strengths. In this case, qualitative methods were emphasized because they are an important means of gathering, analyzing, 
and interpreting data. Social science methods can add value to traditional intelligence analysis, while traditional 
intelligence methods preserve context. Both intelligence analysts and social scientists have much to gain through 
cooperation.  What follows is an overview of the research methods used in this case study. 
 As Bob Glasser has asserted, “Grounded theory’s power and usefulness emerge in the realizations which come 
from doing.” 43 Grounded theory, a qualitative approach, was used to complete a portion of this study and is here defined 
as theory generated from data.44 Adele Clarke’s interpretation of grounded theory in Situational Analysis: Grounded 
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Theory after the Postmodern Turn provides the most suitable method for this study. 45 Clarke takes this method and 
applies the data through a modified version of spatially integrated social science.  
Grounded theory is used to develop a theory from the data. It is emergent, and since no theoretical models exist 
that address the study’s interests, it is a valid method. As mentioned, very little literature is written directly on this subject. 
Glasser stated that grounded theory is the best method to use “. . . where there is virtually no direct literature.”46 Further, 
the primary variables that address security incidents involving NGOs are not identified, making this study suitable for 
grounded theory.   
The second portion of this study was conducted as an intelligence problem using a traditional intelligence method 
known as pattern wheel or pattern analysis plot sheet.47 The pattern wheel was used to exploit the themes articulated by 
the grounded theory approach. It visually highlights date and time in rings depicting days of the month and segments 
depicting hours of the day. Each sheet represents a separate year. The pattern wheel is adaptable and can be used for most 
time/space/event/group analyses.  
The combined methods complement each other.  Clarke’s grounded theory method provided the mapping to 
reveal relationships between time, geography, attack types, and targets. Such data is required by the pattern wheel, which 
further refines and identifies any patterns or associations.   This helps to develop theory identifying safer times/locations 
of operation for NGOs. Understanding the cycles of violence in Afghanistan would provide NGOs the opportunity to 
avoid threats and increase their freedom of movement without compromising their security. 
Rarely do intelligence analysts have all of the data or are even aware of all sources of data.48 Gaps in data are 
likely because trained intelligence personnel do not staff the reporting agency. As a result, it is probable the reporting 
agency failed to fully report, record, or exploit the data.  
The findings of the study are summarized in Figure 1 and 2 and Table 1.  From the findings, it is clear that attacks 
on NGOs are seasonal and occur on specific days of the week and times of the day.  The data also provided the means of 
attacks and what the attackers’ objectives may have been, based on the type of security incident.  From the data we see 
that location counts in security, as does proximity to government sites and activity.  Importantly, the data indicates that, 
despite NGO claims of neutrality, the insurgency directly affects NGO insecurity.  
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Based on the data, open-source material can supply sufficient material to provide the basis for pattern analysis 
allowing for causal, qualitative, and, if desired, quantitative analysis. Understanding the operation environment, which 
includes weather, belligerents, and terrain, is critical if NGO insecurity in Afghanistan is to be improved.  
Providing Security for NGOs 
NGO-driven intelligence obviously mates two of the three pillars of the Afghanistan Compact, namely security 
and socio-economic development.  It provides the opportunity to share incident data, intelligence products, and to provide 
NGOs and other development staff the freedom of movement to visit villages and Afghan officials.  In general, NGOs do 
not understand the intelligence that they need. 
Government agencies and academe need to increase the capacity of NGOs to create their own security. 
Academics and NGOs share an individualistic nature that may provide academics with a non-intrusive entry point to 
increase NGO security.  Due to organizational culture, military or government agencies may not be as well received as 
academics.  Furthermore, the NGO concept of security is based on acceptance while the military concept of security is 
based on situational dominance. 
Both NGOs and the Canadian Forces (CF) are unique subcultures.  The organizational culture of NGOs has 
sometimes created mistrust or misunderstanding among the NGOs, the UN, and various international organizations, 
including NATO and, by extension, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  Understanding the culture, 
policies, and politics of NGOs adds context to the decisions and practices considered acceptable as well as those that are 
distasteful. Gaining support and cooperation among NGOs is vital for successful NGO-driven intelligence. Without input, 
there is little to analyze.  
A comparison of these two subcultures may assist in understanding why NGOs are so uncomfortable with 
intelligence. NGO cultures can be characterized as compassionate, people-centered, striving toward economic equality, 
solving local problems as a means of addressing the root problem, employing locals, looking at long-term objectives, and 
attempting to fairly distribute resources.49 On the other hand, the military culture can be characterized as mission-driven, 
timing-driven, direct, clearly ordered, readily identifiable, self-sustaining, and immediate-results orientated.50  
NGOs are driven to exceed expectations by donors, while the military must complete difficult tasks on order with 
little warning from their political masters. Military tasks originate from legitimate political masters. These same political 
masters dictate what constitutes acceptable military practices; conversely, NGOs derive acceptable practices internally and 
from their donor.  
Many NGOs prefer to keep an arm’s-length distance from authority as they feel proximity violates their 
neutrality, a key principle of their acceptance practices.51 Fear of exploitation has led to clear statements regarding 
information exchanges: 
Before, during, and after any conflict, a clear channel of communication must be available for timely 
exchange between humanitarian organizations and, under coordination of the UN, military forces. 
However, Oxfam will not provide any information that may endanger communities or risk the security 
of our staff. We will not provide information for military purposes.52 
Aware of the potential for abuse, misinformation, and loss of their own political agenda, NGOs are wary of 
intelligence offered by the military or the UN.53 
Since organizational culture counts, the form that intelligence takes within these NGOs is destined to be different 
from that of any national intelligence agency. A culture that resists an organized, centralized system poses unique 
opportunities and challenges in the creation of intelligence.  Understanding the importance of organizational culture, an 
individualistic nature and the need for NGOs to distance themselves from government authority may provide academics 
with an entry point to enhance the analytic capability of NGO-driven intelligence.   
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Recommendation 
Academia has a role to play in the creation of NGO-driven intelligence. Academic methods and studies in many 
of the social sciences may provide the basis of analysis for NGOs operating in insecure conflict zones.  Intelligence is a 
sensitive subject and can be dangerous to produce. To avoid the danger of producing intelligence, the detailed analytical 
effort need not reside within Afghanistan.  To preserve the context of data and increase the volume, NGOs might consider 
maintaining and reinforcing NGO intelligence focal points but conducting their analysis from remote locations. 
Information originating from the field could be forwarded to the focal point and onto another, safer remote location, such 
as a university or think tank. The focal point for intelligence collection would not have the burden, or danger, associated 
with the generation of intelligence. It would remove all threats associated with the generation of intelligence but be able to 
provide up-to-date assessments.  
Currently, NGO security is based on the occasional field security assessment.54 This practice may impede security 
because it reduces the opportunity to include daily changes, which can be dynamic and might drastically alter NGO 
vulnerability. The inability to receive daily inputs, combined with the absence of a single security information database, 
impairs analysis. Furthermore, a lack of continuity and professional analysis means a clear understanding of the field 
situation is unlikely. NGOs are usually focused on core tasks such as supplying food, clean water, and medical support. A 
field-deployed NGO does not have the time, computing resources, training, or opportunity to generate intelligence even 
when assigned that task. The process of creating intelligence is specialist work that is complex and time- and resource-
consuming, and there are dangers associated with the generation of intelligence that NGOs donors may not be willing to 
endure.  
Leveraging and remotely exploiting data provided by NGOs would allow analysts and academics the freedom to 
provide high-quality causal, qualitative, and quantitative research products.55 Combinations of models and methods could 
result in effective intelligence. Regardless of the analytical tools used — whether causal mechanisms or qualitative or 
quantitative research methods — IT support is required. The opportunity to exploit data hidden within NGOs requires 
advanced training and computing power, neither of which is easily found in conflict zones, making remote data 
exploitation even more attractive. 
 Remote location analysis would offer several advantages, including an opportunity to provide objective analysis 
of power dynamics, regional and local analysis, and conflict monitoring. Distance removes political pressure. In 
Afghanistan, there are several sources of political pressure, including, but not restricted to, the IRA, Taliban, warlords, 
organized crime, and personal interest. Distance encourages the analyst to adopt a dispassionate approach resulting in 
bias-free assessment. NGO-driven intelligence products could avoid intelligence tailored to suit a preferred policy.56  
 Remote analysis may not be that difficult to establish once agreement among NGOs has been reached.  A 
researcher with appropriate field experience, a research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, 
a reduced teaching load, and a small team of graduate students would provide a senior researcher all that is necessary to 
begin to increase the security of NGOs.  Similar work has been undertaken at other universities that research human 
security. 
Remote analysis is not perfect.  The success of this concept is dependant on sustained agency buy-in, the 
development of a good governance structure, and the availability of accessible and effective technological solutions. 
CONCLUSION 
NGO-driven intelligence has many advantages, especially in Afghanistan, where it offers security and socio-
economic development.  It also enables NGOs to share incident data and provides them and other development staff with 
freedom of movement to operate among Afghans.  The concept brings into play funding, resources, capabilities, and staff 
that have not been leveraged for NGO security to this point. 
NGO insecurity can be mitigated through increased analysis of open-source data. Little theory exists regarding 
NGO insecurity; however, strands of evidence, based on basic pattern analyses conducted in this study, indicate that 
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NGO-driven intelligence could significantly contribute to the safety of NGOs in Afghanistan. Unstructured data from 
NGO security-incident reports provided sufficient information to create basic intelligence. The study, without fully 
exploiting the data, clearly indicates that even limited open-source information could provide the means to create NGO-
driven intelligence and assist NGOs in avoiding potential security incidents within Afghanistan.  
Theory must be tentative in nature, making a grounded theory approach effective in this case.  Grounded theory is 
emergent and is intended to provide an understanding of a researched situation. Few would disagree that insecurity in 
Afghanistan continues to evolve and requires constant study because insurgent tactics, techniques, and procedures 
(TTPs)57 also evolve; although ad hoc NGO mitigation practices are effective today, they may not be tomorrow. In the 
end, NGO mitigation practices, such as acceptance practices, will likely need to evolve to meet the challenges of NGO 
insecurity in Afghanistan.  
NGOs remain vulnerable to criminality and insurgent activity and, as the literature illustrates, are increasingly 
identified with the government. Security incidents are increasingly violent, with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
becoming more common. Ultimately, humanitarian work is about action, not necessarily reason; however, actions without 
consideration for the operating environment will likely result in the undoing of all good works.   
Intelligence is not the key to success in NGO operations; many successful NGO efforts have occurred without the 
benefit of intelligence. However, in increasingly unrestrained conflicts, NGO-driven intelligence, assisted by remote 
analysis provided by academia, may prevent the deaths of NGO personnel, and the loss of equipment and valuable aid.  
David T. MacLeod is a former infantryman, intelligence operator, and analyst and is currently a PhD Candidate 
at the University of New Brunswick.  
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